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Abstract 
This research work considers the impact of Auditor’s tenure on quality of audit report. There have been 
divergent views from previous researchers.  On one hand, the first school of thought is of the view that as the 
tenures of the auditors become longer, they gain expertise of the businesses of their clients and therefore, their 
ability to detect fraud increases; conversely, the ability of the manager to commit fraud reduces. On the other 
hand, the contrary view is that long audit tenureship may bring about increased familiarity between the auditor 
and the managers. Consequently, the auditor may become more sympathetic with the management. This may in 
turn reduce the readiness of the auditor to qualify his report; and therefore increasing the client’s fraud 
incentives. The impact of auditor’s tenure on quality of audit report depends on his ability or the level of his 
independence. The contributions of previous researchers were accessed. The study suggests ; a period of one to 
three years as an ideal audit tenure, regular change of audit team (where necessary), review of statutory and 
professional provisions etc.                  
Keywords; Auditors Tenure, Fraud, Audit Report and Auditor’s Independence.   
 
Introduction  
In view of recent corporate scandals, auditor’s tenure, and independence have taken the centre stage of 
discussions. Opinions are centered on whether the auditee should replace its auditor on a regular basis or whether 
the auditor should be allowed to build a long- term relationship with the client.  
 According to those who are in favour of long-term relationship between the auditor and auditee, long-
term relationship would allow the auditor to gain expertise of the operations of his client and therefore makes the 
auditor to be more efficient. It enhances the ability of the auditor to detect irregularities. On the other hand, the 
proponents of regular replacement of auditor are of the view that long-term auditor/auditee relationship may 
result in empathy between the auditor and auditee and would therefore lead to loss of auditor’s independence. 
Loss of auditor independence may consequently result in poor quality of audit report as the auditor may 
disregard certain due-diligence and misconduct by management or staff.  
 Fairchild (2008) says “the auditor’s fraud-detecting ability is positively related to tenure, implying that 
increasing tenure reduces managerial fraud-incentives. However, an increase in tenure may also result in a 
reduction in auditor independence, and an increase in auditor empathy towards the manager, implying that 
increasing tenure may increase fraud incentives. According to Asthana, Balsam, & Krishnan,(2007), “The 
financial scandal surrounding the collapse of Enron caused erosion in the reputation of its auditors, Andersen, 
leading concerns about Andersen’s ability to continue in existence and ultimately its demise”. On their part, 
Chaney,& Pilipich,(2002:1221-1245) say that the disclosures about Andersen caused a decline in its reputation 
and Andersen’s clients suffered significant loss of market value.        
 
Literature Review 
As a result of recent policy debate on mandatory auditor rotation, there has been an increasing research focus on 
audit tenure, fraud and quality of audit.  
 According to Mantz and Sharaf (1981), Lyer and Rama (2004), there has long been concern that the 
duration of relationship between the auditor and client potentially affects audit quality, but contains conflicting 
arguments.  
 Geiger and Raghumandan (2002) test the relationship between auditor tenure and audit reporting failure 
using a sample of US companies entering bankruptcy. They opine that there is a negative relationship between 
auditor tenure and audit failures.  
 On the other hand, Carey and Sumnett (2006) Say that there is a positive relationship between auditor 
tenure and audit failure in Australia. This means that as auditor tenure increases, the auditor’s ability to detect 
fraud reduces.  
 Marnet (2004) discusses how auditor independence may be compromised by self-serving biases. For 
instance, an auditor who had earlier issued an unqualified report may be confronted with a subsequent 
psychological pressures to self-justify his earlier opinion.  
 On his part, Fairchild (2008) using a game theory concludes that the auditor,s ability to detect fraud 
increases with auditor,s tenure. That is, as auditor’s tenure increases, his fraud detecting efforts increase and 
therefore, the chances of fraud detection and probability of qualified audits increases. He is also of the opinion 
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that as the auditor’s tenure increases, managerial fraud incentive drop, thereby giving rise to reduction in 
managerial fraud and qualified audit reports.  
 According to Fairchild (2008) ‘beyond a critical level of tenure, the auditor becomes sympathetic 
towards the manager, and she reduces fraud-detecting efforts. This results in reduction in qualified audits and an 
increase in fraud’.  Carcello & Nagy (2004) says that; 
rotation of auditors would also reduce any financial incentives for  external auditors to compromise 
their judgment on borderline accounting issues in disagreeing with management and auditors would no 
longer be risking a stream of revenues that they believed would continue in ‘perpetuity’ since the audit 
engagement would no longer be perceived as permanent. 
 Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds (2002) are of the opinion that absolute value of unexpected accruals is 
higher in the early years of auditor – client relationship as compared to medium auditor’s tenure, but they say 
that no relationship exists between absolute value of unexpected accruals and auditor’s tenure when medium 
tenure is compared with long tenure. Carcello et al (2004) are also of the view that the probability of fraudulent 
reporting is highest early in the tenure of audit firms ( i.e.the first three years). Hamilton, Ruddock, Stokes, and 
Taylor (2005) opine ,“in contrast to the existing evidence, our paper provides support for the view that audit 
partner rotation is associated with a reduction in relatively aggressive accounting……..” 
 Ghosh and Moon (2005) find that absolute discretionary accruals and the use of large negative special 
items to manage earnings decline with auditor’s tenure.  
 Davis, Soo and Trompeter (2003), Casterella, Knechel and Walker (2002) opine that audit quality is 
lower given a longer auditor’s tenure.  
 Davis et al (2003), declare that discretionary accruals increase with auditor’s tenure and conclude that 
management gains additional reporting flexibility as auditor’s tenure increases.  
          On his part, Hills ( 2002) states that forcing a change of auditors  
         can only lower the quality of audits and increase their costs. The                                                                             
         longer an auditor is with a company’ the more it learns about its 
        personnel, its business and its intrinsic values. To change every 
        several years will simply create a merry-go-round of 
        mediocrity. 
 
Fraud 
Fraud has been identified as a significant problem endemic both in the public and private sectors of any nation’s 
economy. The effects of  fraud include premature termination of employments, court cases, liquidation of 
business entities or corporate failures and very serious negative financial impact on the economy. While many 
business organizations are yet to recover from the Envon’s experience, the Cadbury debacle that saw the exit of 
the key players (like the group Managing Director, the group Financial Director, the External auditors; to 
mention but few) has further called for regular review of relevant statutory provisions and professional 
pronouncements; and ensuring that they are strictly complied with.  
 Gupta(2005) defines fraud as ‘intentional misrepresentation of financial information by one or more 
individuals among persons charged with governance (e.g. board of directors and audit committee in the case of a 
company), management, employees or third parties.  
 Messier  (2000:153) describes fraud as ‘intentional misstatements that include management fraud and 
defalcation”.  
 Oxford Advanced learner’s dictionary 6th edition on its part defines fraud as the crime of deceiving 
somebody in order to get money or goods illegally.  
 Fraud is a deliberate or intentional act by a privileged individual or a group of individuals working in 
concert which gives rise to a financial misstatement. Where the act giving rise to a financial misstatement is 
intentional, it is referred to as ‘fraud’. Fraud therefore is a willful act with the intent to misappropriate assets or 
misrepresent facts in the financial statements.  
 Misappropriation of assets is also referred to as ‘defalcation’. Examples of such fraud include; theft of 
entity’s assets, teaming and lading or carry over fraud , inclusion of dummy names (non-existence staff) in pay-
roll, overstating amount payable on pay-roll,deliberate use of wrong salary scale ,embezzlement of unclaimed 
wages , illegal sale of scraps ,over invoicing of contract, illegal withdrawal of materials from store for fictitious 
repairs or maintenance etc.  
Fraudulent financial reporting does not involve misappropriation of the entity’s assets. It is perpetrated 
usually; by management in order to enable it accomplish it’s aims. The aim may be to deceive the users of 
financial statements to make a wrong decisions.  
Therefore, fraudulent financial reporting is usually done to further the goals of the management; such as 
presenting a better profit profile. Though the immediate intention is not to better the lot of the employees, where 
it involves overstating the turnover or profit (for example), it may cause the entity to pay a higher bonuses, 
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incentives or dividends.  
Examples of fraudulent financial statements include; understating expenses by capitalizing costs that 
should have been expensed, overstating turnover by recognizing revenues before they are earned, failure to 
provide for bad and doubtful debts, overstating assets, understating liabilities, disclosures not adequately made in 
the account etc.  
 
Fraud Detection 
Fraud detection refers to discovering of fraud that has made the financial statement to be misrepresented. 
Detection of fraud can be facilitated by installation and full implementation of an adequate system of internal 
controls.  
According to Gupta (2005), persons charged with governance are those that are entrusted with the 
supervision, direction and control of an entity and are thus accountable for ensuring that the entity achieves its 
objectives. They monitor the overall effectiveness and integrity of entity’s accounting and internal control 
systems and ensure the entity’s compliance with legal and regulatory framework. The management of the entity 
(chief executive officer and his team) is required to establish and implement appropriate controls and ensure 
their continued and effective operation.  
 
Responsibility of the Auditor to Detect Fraud and Errors 
It is not the primary duty of the auditor to detect fraud and errors. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards 
(GAAS) require the auditor to plan and perform his work with due professional care, skill and diligence. The 
application of due professional care enables the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance that the financial 
statement is free from material misstatements.  
 When ever the auditor’s suspicion is aroused, he is expected to carry out such tests that would enable 
him to obtain reasonable assurance that there are no material misstatements in the accounts.  
 Note that where there is concealment of fraud through falsification of documents or/and collusion, a 
properly planned and executed audit may not detect material frauds. Therefore auditor’s opinion does not 
guarantee that the financial statement is free from material misstatements. And the fact that there are material 
misstatements (errors or frauds) in the financial statements does not mean that the auditor had; failed to obtain 
reasonable assurance, not applied due professional care, failed to comply with generally accepted auditing 
standards, or not adequately planned, performed or made his audit opinion.  
 
Audit Report 
According to Messier (2000:55), “Audit report is the main product or output of the audit”. Gupta (2005:582) 
describes audit report as ‘the end product of every audit. He says that it is the medium through which an auditor 
expresses his opinion on the financial statements or other prepositions under audit.  
The report communicates the auditor’s findings to the users of the financial statement. It is the 
culmination of a process of collecting and evaluating sufficient competent evidence concerning the fair 
presentation of the management’s assertions in the financial statements. The audit report adds value to the 
financial statements because of the auditor’s objective and independent opinion on the fairness of the financial 
statements.  
 The report is required to state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance with the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
 According to O’Reilly, Mcdonnell, Winograd, Gerson and Jaenicke (1998:28.8), Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles provide a consistent frame of reference against which each management’s assertions that 
are implicit in the financial statements can be evaluated.  
 The Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) require the auditor to plan and execute his work 
with due professional care, skill and diligence. According to O’Reilly et al (1998:4.5), due professional care, in 
turn requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism.  
 The exercise of due care enables the auditor to obtain reasonable assurance that financial statements are 
free from material misstatement. When fraud is detected (whether material or immaterial), the auditor is 
expected to consider the implications for the integrity of the entity’s employees (and particularly the integrity of 
the management) and the possible effect on other aspects of the audit and report accordingly.  
 SAS number 99 requires auditors to overcome some natural tendencies such as over reliance on the 
client’s representations and biases, and approach the audit with skeptical attitude and questioning mind. The 
auditor is also required to set aside past relationships and not assume that all clients are honest. The standard 
provides suggestions on how auditors can learn how to adopt a more critical, skeptical mind-set on their 
engagements, particularly during audit planning and the evaluation of audit evidence.  
 According to Ramos (2003), the mere fact that the engagement team has a serious discussion about the 
entity’s susceptibility to fraud also serves to remind auditor’s the possibility does exist in every engagement in 
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spite of any history or preconceived biases about management’s honesty and integrity.  
 
Auditor’s Independence 
Izedonmi (2000:83) opines that “Auditor’s independence implies the ability of an auditor to perform his audit 
work in accordance to his judgment, free from any undue influence and without being biased”. Independence is 
an attitude of mind characterized by integrity and objectivity. An auditor should not only be independent but he 
should also be seen as being independent. An auditor is expected to avoid undue influence. He should be 
independent in planning his work, in carrying out his work and in reporting his opinion in respect of the financial 
statements. In other words, the auditor should be free from any influence or interference in the planning and 
conduct of his work and he should be objective in reporting his opinion without fear of the management, staff, 
shareholders or any other stakeholder for that matter.  
 Independence is an important attribute of an auditor. The auditor needs to be independent of everyone 
who has contact with the business of his client. An auditor cannot be objective unless he is independent of all 
persons. The auditor’s independence must be beyond question. He should be seen to be independent by all. 
 Objectivity is a state of mind that is characterized by the fulfillment of professional and legal 
obligations without compromising ethical beliefs or yielding to the demands of other persons. In other words, 
objectivity helps to ensure respect for rule of law and maintenance of professional integrity. It also helps in 
satisfying the expectation of the client and the public at large.  
 Integrity is an essential quality of an auditor or any professional. Iyoha (2005:13) defines integrity as 
“the aspect of one’s character rooted in his conviction which serves to deter him from taking advantage of his 
position or strength to gain at the expense of his organization, customer, client or subordinate”. A person of 
integrity should be honest, truthful and fair in all his dealings.  
 The overall rule of professional conduct is that an accountant must always approach his work with 
integrity and objectivity. He must approach his work in a spirit of independence of mind.  
 Integrity implies honesty. Both words are used interchangeably. According to Aguolo (2006), where as 
honesty connotes telling the truth, integrity implies keeping faith even when there is scope and opportunity to 
default without consequence. According to him, honesty is enforced value while integrity is a trait acquired as a 
result of upbringing, training or association. He says, honesty propels the individual to keep the rules for fear of 
being exposed and probably face the consequences, integrity propels the individual to keep the rules even when 
he is sure that no one is watching and in fact there is no chance of being detected. An honest person always looks 
out for loopholes in the laws and exploits them where they exist, but a person of integrity does not bother to 
exploit loopholes in the law.  
 
Threats to Auditor’s Independence 
Certain factors pose threats to independence of the auditors. In other words, these factors impair the 
independence of the auditors. Some of these factors are: familiarity threat, fear of being fired, shareholdings in 
client company, loans to or from client, hospitality, auditor acting as a trustee, mutual business interest, 
participation in the affairs of a client, litigation, etc.  
 
Rules of Professional Conduct to Ensure Auditors Independence 
These rules serve as guidance to the accountant in the conduct of his work and they relate to; Fees, Personal 
Relationships, Beneficial shareholding, Loans to and from clients, Acceptance of Goods or Services from a 
client, Commission, Dealings with clients’ monies, Provision of other services, Officer or staff of the client 
should not take part in the audit, Where a partner or an audit staff of a member is an officer of the client, 
Receivership, Liquidation and auditors, A member should not accept or perform work which he or she is not 
competent to undertake unless he or she obtains such advice and assistance as will enable him or her to 
competently carryout the work, A member should carryout his or her work with due skill, care, diligence and 
expectation and with proper regard for technical and professional standards expected of him as a member, A firm 
should not accept a prospective audit where a partner or staff (or person closely connected to them) acts as a 
trustee of a trust; Which holds more than 10% of the shares of the prospective entity or Whose investment in the 
prospective client entity exceeds 10% of its total assets, A firm should not audit financial statements that include 
the product of specialist valuation by the firm or its associates, No audit engagement partner should remain in 
charge of audit of a listed company for more than seven consecutive years; and at least five years must elapse 
before such a partner can return to the engagement, An auditor should not act for two opposing clients in respect 
of negotiation, settlement of claims unless the two clients have agreed that he should act as an arbitrator, A 
practice should not accept an audit where the fees will be based and payable on the successful completion of the 
audit etc.  
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CAMA 1990 Rules to Ensure Auditors’ Independence 
The Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 as amended made provisions that are expected to ensure 
the independence of the auditors. These provisions centre on appointment of auditor, disqualification of the 
auditor, remuneration of the auditor, rights of the auditor and removal of the auditor. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations. 
The length of auditor’s relationship with his client is an important factor to be considered when the causes of 
fraud or/ and the quality audit report are being determined. 
Auditor’s tenure impacts directly on fraud commission and quality of audit report. From the study, it is 
observed that as the tenure of the auditor gets longer, the relationship of the staff of both the auditor and the 
client gets more intimate or cordial. This situation impairs the independence and objectivity of the auditor. 
Chances are that the auditor may over look certain activities of the client’s staff which should have being 
investigated under normal circumstances. As a result of this, the fraud incentive for the client’s staff is being 
enhanced. 
On the other hand, as the auditor’s tenure becomes longer, he knows more about the operations and the 
accounting system of the client. Under this situation, the ability of the auditor to detect fraud is enhanced. 
Therefore, the quality of audit report is improved. 
In order to achieve an adequate result, there is need to moderate the length of auditor’s tenure. This is 
the reason for the agitation for rotation of auditors or members of audit team. The study suggests an audit tenure 
of between one and three years. However it may be necessary to strike a balance between fraud prevention and 
quality of audit report.  
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